Asia-Pacific security depends on managing differences, not sowing discord

Editor's note: Xu Weijun is an associate research professor at the Institute of Public Policy, South China University of Technology. His research interests include East Asian international relations and China-US relations.The ongoing 13th Xiangshan Forum held a plenary session where international experts and officials exchanged views on the risks and challenges to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. The article states that long-term stability in the Asia-Pacific depends on managing differences and building trust through dialogue, crisis management and practical cooperation, rather than confrontation. It reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily those of CGTN.

Although no wars have broken out in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years, the region has faced a range of security challenges. Risks in the Taiwan Strait have risen, security tensions between China and Japan have deepened, the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue remains unresolved, and friction in the South China Sea continues to recur. Meanwhile, countries have increased defense spending, moved military deployments forward, strengthened alliances, and stepped up naval and air activities. The region has gradually fallen into a security dilemma. All parties have increased investments in their own security, yet the region's overall sense of security continues to decline.

The root of this situation lies in the highly diverse security concerns across the Asia-Pacific, and the lack of a basic consensus among the parties regarding the sources of threats and security boundaries. China prioritizes national reunification, territorial sovereignty and stability along its periphery. The United States seeks to maintain its military superiority and alliance system in the region. Japan is concerned with the situation in the East China Sea, its Southwestern Islands and the Taiwan Strait. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) emphasizes regime security and strategic deterrence. The Republic of Korea (ROK) worries about the threat posed by DPRK's nuclear and missile programs. The Philippines and Vietnam focus on their rights and interests in the South China Sea. The parties differ markedly on the sources of threats, the prioritization of risks, and the scope of security boundaries. These differences make both a shared understanding of security and a single regional security framework difficult to achieve.

Consequently, the practical objectives of regional security governance should focus on managing differences, reducing miscalculations and establishing a basic level of mutual trust. China's Global Security Initiative (GSI) advocates common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, stresses taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously, and emphasizes peacefully resolving differences through dialogue and consultation. This approach holds practical significance for the Asia-Pacific.

The key to regional security lies not in bringing all countries under a single security framework, but in enabling different security concerns to coexist over time and keeping competition within manageable bounds. For the region, security governance requires first acknowledging that differences will persist in the long term, and then seeking a minimum set of rules that all parties can accept.

First, a minimum level of consensus on security needs to be established. Asia-Pacific countries are unlikely to overcome their strategic differences in the short term, but they can clarify common ground as a starting point. All parties should avoid direct military conflict, prevent accidental incidents at sea and in the air from escalating rapidly, maintain communication channels during crises, and prevent localized disputes from spilling over into regional confrontation.

As the two most influential powers in the region, China and the United States have a particular need to sustain stable strategic communication and effective mechanisms for managing military crises. China and Japan, China and the Philippines, and the DPRK and the ROK also need to maintain their own crisis management channels. As long as these channels remain open, all parties will have the opportunity to ease tensions before the situation passes a critical threshold.

Second, regional countries should strengthen risk isolation to prevent different security issues from interacting. A troubling feature of the current Asia-Pacific security environment is that issues, including the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula, are increasingly likely to be incorporated into a single framework of strategic competition. Friction in one area may rapidly trigger alliance commitments and military deployments, thereby narrowing the scope for diplomatic resolution. Countries in the region need to consciously establish "firewalls" to ensure that a single dispute does not automatically trigger confrontation in other areas, and that a maritime incident does not escalate into a broader military confrontation.

Even when political relations deteriorate, mechanisms such as economic and trade cooperation, maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and relief, military hotlines and people-to-people exchanges should be kept operational as far as possible. The aim of crisis management is to preserve the time and channels needed to de-escalate the situation and prevent the situation from being dictated by a single incident.

Third, regional countries need to preserve sufficient strategic autonomy. Although Japan, the ROK and the Philippines maintain alliances with the United States, their security concerns differ. Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore also have their own assessments of risks and policy choices. A country can engage in security cooperation with the United States while maintaining close economic and trade relations with China. It can have reservations about certain Chinese policies while declining to participate in military arrangements aimed at countering China.

ASEAN's longstanding emphasis on openness, inclusiveness, and strategic autonomy offers an approach well suited to the realities of the Asia-Pacific. For major powers, respecting this autonomy helps create the conditions necessary to reduce insecurity in the region.

Finally, trust should be built gradually through practical, manageable forms of cooperation. Given the current lack of strategic mutual trust in the region, it is unrealistic to expect all parties to immediately establish a high level of political trust. Areas such as maritime search and rescue, disaster response, counterterrorism, public health and military personnel exchanges are more suitable as starting points for cooperation. Stable, sustained interaction can enhance policy transparency and enable all parties to develop a habit of communication before a crisis arises. Mutual trust rarely emerges from dialogue alone, but builds gradually through repeated cooperation and predictable conduct.

Security differences in the Asia-Pacific will not disappear soon. The constructive strategic stability between China and the United States will continue, and security issues concerning the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea are unlikely to be resolved in the short term. A more viable path to regional security is to acknowledge differences, contain escalation, maintain communication, and preserve each country's policy autonomy. The value of the GSI lies in translating these principles into concrete arrangements for crisis management and confidence-building.