Beyond rhetoric: What Japan must do to rebuild trust with China

Editor's note: Jessica Durdu, a special commentator for CGTN, is a foreign affairs specialist with a PhD in law. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's latest policy address comes at a consequential moment for Japan and its relations with China. At home, her government faces demographic contraction, inflationary pressures and difficult fiscal choices. Abroad, however, perhaps no relationship presents a more delicate test of Tokyo's strategic judgment than its relationship with China.

Takaichi's description of China as an "important neighboring country," with which Japan aims to build a "constructive and stable" relationship, and her stated intention to comprehensively promote a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests are therefore noteworthy. Yet another part of Tokyo's message is equally important: Japan intends to "assert what must be asserted" on security matters. In other words, Tokyo would "say what must be said."

The question is whether these two strands of policy can be reconciled on practice. For China-Japan relations, the central challenge is increasingly not a lack of diplomatic language, but the gap between conciliatory rhetoric and strategic behavior.

That gap became particularly visible after Takaichi's remarks in November 2025 suggesting that a "Taiwan contingency" involving the use of force could constitute a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan, a legal designation that could open the way for the deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The remarks contributed to one of the sharpest downturns in bilateral relations in recent years. Takaichi subsequently stressed that Japan's basic position on Taiwan remained unchanged, while declining to retract the remarks.

This episode illustrates a larger problem. Diplomatic reassurance has limited value if it is accompanied by security policies that the other side interprets as moving in the opposite direction from the stated objective.

International media coverage of Takaichi's address has likewise focused on this tension between conciliatory language and strategic firmness. AFP reporting highlighted her description of China as an "important neighbor" and her pledge to build a "constructive and stable relationship," while placing those remarks against the backdrop of bilateral ties that have remained severely strained since her comments on Taiwan. The Straits Times went further, interpreting her emphasis on dialogue, including her use of a classical Chinese saying, as potentially conciliatory in tone, while stressing that this was accompanied by a firm position on maritime, military and other security concerns. An analysis by South Korea's East Asia Institute has likewise questioned whether the "important neighbor" formulation represents a genuine thaw or, rather, an effort to manage tensions without altering Tokyo's underlying strategic posture. Taken together, these reactions suggest that Takaichi's words have been received less as a fundamental reset in China-Japan relations than as a carefully calibrated attempt to stabilize a relationship still constrained by deeper political and security disagreements.

Japan has continued to strengthen and adjust its postwar security posture. Earlier this year, Takaichi pledged to reinforce Japan's defense capabilities, revise key national security documents and ease restrictions on defense exports, while advancing defense spending at around 2% of GDP. Tokyo justifies such policies by citing what it describes as an increasingly challenging security environment. Beijing, however, assesses them against the longer historical background of Japanese militarism in Asia.

That history cannot simply be separated from contemporary diplomacy, particularly when security policy is involved.

The point is not that postwar Japan has failed to acknowledge its past. It has. The 1995 Murayama Statement expressed "deep remorse" and a "heartfelt apology" for Japan's colonial rule and aggression, while the 1998 China-Japan Joint Declaration explicitly recognized that squarely facing the past and correctly understanding history constitute an important foundation for developing bilateral relations.

The challenge is consistency. When historical questions are subsequently relativized by political figures, while changes to Japan's military posture are pursued without sufficient sensitivity to regional historical memory, previous expressions of remorse risk losing some of their confidence-building effect. Historical reconciliation is not secured by a document signed once; it is a political responsibility that must be sustained across generations.

The Taiwan question is a red line that must not be crossed and bears directly on the political foundation of China-Japan relations.

The 1972 Joint Communique established the political foundation for modern China-Japan relations. Japan recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and stated that it "fully understands and respects" Beijing's position regarding Taiwan. The communique also committed the two countries to principles including peaceful coexistence and mutual non-interference in internal affairs.

This is why statements suggesting possible Japanese military involvement in a "Taiwan contingency" carry consequences that extend beyond an ordinary security debate. From Beijing's perspective, Taiwan concerns China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and therefore touches on one of its most fundamental national interests. Tokyo should recognize that increasingly explicit discussions of possible Japanese armed intervention in the Taiwan Strait risk crossing this red line and further damaging political trust.

There is nevertheless another path available for stabilizing the relationship.

China and Japan already possess much of the diplomatic architecture needed for stabilization. The four major political documents developed since normalization in 1972 provide a framework based on peaceful coexistence, mutual benefit, historical understanding and the principle that the two countries should be partners rather than threats to each other. Indeed, the 2008 joint statement reaffirmed that China and Japan would "face history squarely, advance toward the future" and build mutual trust.

The economic rationale for doing so remains compelling. China and Japan are major Asian economies whose production networks, trade flows and regional prosperity remain deeply interconnected. At a time when the global economy is already confronting geopolitical fragmentation, energy insecurity and rising protectionist pressures, Northeast Asia has little to gain from another cycle of strategic confrontation.

Takaichi's reference to China as an "important neighboring country" can therefore serve as a starting point. But diplomacy ultimately acquires credibility through actions.

If Tokyo genuinely seeks a constructive and stable relationship with Beijing, it should translate that language into greater restraint on issues involving China's core interests, uphold the political commitments underpinning bilateral relations, address historical questions with consistency and sincerity, and ensure that Japan's evolving security policy does not become a further source of regional distrust.

More than five decades after normalization, China and Japan do not need another rhetorical reset. They need to restore political confidence.

And confidence, unlike rhetoric, is built through what governments do.

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