Making the Party ever-vibrant: Understanding the self-revolution of a revolutionary Party

Editor's Note: Xia Lu is a professor at the School of CPC History and Party Building and a research associate at the National Academy of Development and Strategies of Renmin University of China. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Since 2012, taking full and vigorous management of the Party and promoting self-revolution have become the main theme of the Communist Party of China's (CPC) long-term Party-building project. The CPC's emphasis on "self-revolution" should be understood not as a call for another social revolution, but as a theory of how a ruling party can continuously reform, discipline and renew itself while remaining in power. Despite its achievements, people still ask questions like why the CPC thinks it is necessary, what the project actually consists of, and which parts may be relevant to developing countries. This essay seeks to help readers understand the aspiration and mission of a revolutionary Party.

Why did the CPC elevate 'self-revolution' to such an important concept?

The basic problem the CPC identified is a very old one: how does a political organization that has accumulated enormous power prevent that power from producing corruption, bureaucratization, complacency and ultimately political decline? The CPC's own historical formulation is unusually explicit. Its 2021 historical resolution says that a Marxist ruling party's advanced character cannot simply be assumed; it has to be maintained through continuous self-reform, criticism and correction of mistakes. It describes the Party's ability to "own up to its errors" and reform itself as part of the explanation for its longevity.

This connects to what Chinese political discourse calls the "historical cycle": governing organizations rise, become successful, accumulate privileges and eventually become detached from society and lose their capacity to govern. "Self-revolution" is intended to interrupt that cycle before the deterioration becomes existential. This is why the concept became particularly prominent in the new era. Since 2012, it has been translated into an extensive program of Party discipline, anti-corruption, cadre supervision, ideological education, organizational reform and institutionalization of Party rules. In January 2026, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, again described confining power within an institutional framework, strengthening supervision and continuing the anti-corruption campaign as central components of full and rigorous Party self-governance. So anti-corruption is important, but "self-revolution" is broader than just anti-corruption.

What is the essence of the project?

Self-revolution consists of the following interconnected mechanisms. First, it involves continuous internal correction. The Party does not regard itself as an organization that becomes "finished" once it has established political power. Instead, it needs mechanisms capable of identifying a spectrum of problems, including corruption, bureaucratic formalism, abuse of power, ideological or organizational drift, complacency among officials, disconnection between cadres and ordinary citizens, and institutional weaknesses. The important distinction is between "revolution" against an external ruling class and "self-revolution" against problems within the ruling organization itself. The CPC explicitly presents this as a permanent process rather than a one-off campaign.

Second, it has mechanisms to constrain power. This is perhaps the most practically important element. The current formulation is increasingly about institutionalizing supervision, rather than relying merely upon the moral qualities of individual officials. General Secretary Xi's famous formulation – "confining power to an institutional cage" – captures this direction particularly well. It involves Party discipline, inspections, supervision, rules governing officials, anti-corruption institutions and coordination between different oversight mechanisms. In other words, good governance cannot depend only on finding good people. It needs mechanisms that constrain bad behavior even when incentives become distorted. That principle is not uniquely Chinese, but is widely agreed upon and accepted across civilizations.

Third, it emphasizes maintaining organizational capacity. The CPC's concern isn't simply that officials might be corrupted. It is also that a large governing organization can become slow, fragmented, bureaucratic and incapable of implementing national strategy. This is why the concept is linked to cadre selection, discipline, organizational coherence, ideological education and centralized coordination. There is an interesting development lesson here: China's governance experience has often been associated with strong state capacity, policy coordination and the ability to mobilize resources around long-term objectives. Top studies on China's poverty reduction experience, for example, identify capable government, credible policy commitments, coordination and mobilization as important institutional characteristics – while noting that China's historical and institutional context differs from other countries.

Fourth, Party reform is linked to national development. This is crucial, as China is in the process of realizing modernization. The CPC doesn't conceptualize self-revolution as an isolated internal administrative exercise. It argues that the quality of the ruling party directly shapes a country's capacity to achieve modernization, forming a clear causal chain: Party self-governance leads to effective governance, which delivers development, paves the way for modernization, and ultimately brings about national rejuvenation. It is for this reason that the concept is proposed and placed alongside the strategic agendas of Chinese modernization, high-quality development and the long-term development strategy.

Fifth, the ultimate goal is to prevent the ruling party from becoming detached from society. This is perhaps the deepest political logic. The CPC argues that a governing party cannot survive merely on historical legitimacy alone. To maintain this causal dynamic, the ruling party must continually demonstrate its ability to solve emerging problems and deliver public objectives. Correspondingly, the Party's own conceptual framework combines internal discipline, anti-corruption efforts, organizational renewal, policy adaptation, close connection with society, and effective governing performance to sustain the progressive chain of outcomes from self-governance to national rejuvenation. Thus, it is arguable to describe self-revolution as a response to the "unique challenges" confronting a large ruling party and as linked to the modernization of both intra-Party governance and national governance.

What can developing countries learn from it?

Developing countries should be cautious about assuming they can replicate a similar project by simply "copying the Chinese model." A more useful approach is to distinguish the institutional principles behind China's development from its specific political structure.

One important lesson is that development requires genuine state capacity: governments need institutions that can translate strategy into concrete implementation. Anti-corruption efforts also need to be institutional rather than episodic, relying on continuous systems of auditing, supervision, disclosure, investigation, and punishment instead of periodic campaigns. Political organizations also need reliable performance feedback because officials rewarded mainly for pleasing superiors rather than solving real problems can cause governments to become detached from reality.

What's more, the selection and evaluation of officials matters enormously, as development depends on a bureaucracy capable of learning, implementing, and adapting, not merely one that follows procedures. Long-term development also requires organizational continuity, as infrastructure, industrialization, education, technological upgrading, and poverty reduction often depend on policies that endure across decades rather than the lifespan of a single administration.

Finally, experimentation can be highly valuable. China's experience involved not only central planning but also local variation, policy testing, evaluation, and the gradual scaling up of measures that seemed to work.