Editor's note: Adriel Kasonta, a special commentator for CGTN, is a London-based foreign affairs analyst. He is the founder of AK Consultancy and former chairman of the International Affairs Committee at Bow Group, the oldest conservative think tank in the UK. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

This week in Brussels, Europe faces a strategic choice: respond to economic pressure by building higher walls or by building greater competitiveness. That difference matters a lot beyond the EU-China relationship. This may help to determine whether the global economy is moving toward managed cooperation or further fragmentation.

As EU leaders meet on October 15-16, China will inevitably be part of the discussion. Trade tensions are becoming harder to ignore. Eurostat data shows that in 2025 the EU exported 199.6 billion euros ($223.8 billion) worth of goods to China, but imported 559.4 billion euros resulting in a goods deficit of 359.8 billion euros.

That imbalance is real. So are European concerns about market access, industrial subsidies, overcapacity and the competitive pressure facing established manufacturers. But letting a trade problem become a convenient excuse for a much larger European economic malaise is dangerous.

Europe's competitiveness challenge did not begin in Beijing. A report on European competitiveness by Mario Draghi, former European Central Bank president, identifies slowing productivity, demographic pressures, high energy costs, insufficient investment and an innovation gap as structural weaknesses weighing on Europe's long-term prosperity. Draghi also notes that EU companies face electricity prices two to three times higher than those of competitors in the United States and China.

The latest forecasts underline the urgency. The IMF expects a growth of just 0.9% in the euro area in 2026 and 1.2% in 2027, with higher energy costs, weak consumer confidence and Europe's long-standing problems of aging populations and subdued productivity weighing on the outlook.

Tariffs on Chinese goods won't solve these problems. China's rise has certainly intensified competitive pressure. Chinese companies have become formidable players in electric vehicles, batteries, machinery and clean-energy technologies. European policymakers are right to insist on fair competition and reciprocal market access.Yet a substantial difference exists between defending legitimate economic interests and treating economic interdependence itself as a strategic liability.

Brussels should stop to reflect on the magnitude of that interdependence. Manufactured goods accounted for 97.3% of EU imports from China in 2025, while manufactured goods accounted for 86.2% of EU exports to China. In 2024, the EU investment stock in China was 239.3 billion euros, and in 2025, the EU had a surplus of 21.3 billion euros in services trade with China.

This is not a relationship between two detached economies that can be switched off. It is a deeply integrated industrial ecosystem.

That is why protectionism risks becoming self-defeating. Restricting Chinese imports may shield particular European producers in the short term but it can also raise input costs, reduce consumer choice, disrupt supply chains and weaken the very industrial competitiveness Europe is trying to restore. China, meanwhile, would face reduced access to one of the world's largest markets and stronger incentives to redirect trade and investment elsewhere.

Neither side has much to gain from that spiral.

There is a more pragmatic path. Where European investigations establish unfair subsidies or other distortions, the EU should use proportionate, transparent and World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible trade-defense instruments. Where European companies face barriers in China, Beijing should address them with concrete measures. And where disputes remain negotiable, diplomacy should be given room to work.

The electric vehicle debate is a good precedent. In January, the European Commission issued guidance to Chinese exporters interested in alternative price undertakings, emphasizing objective assessment, non-discrimination and WTO compatibility. In February, it accepted a price undertaking from Volkswagen Anhui for the China-made CUPRA Tavascan, with pledges to invest in Europe.

This is the sort of economic statecraft that deserves more attention: firm where necessary, flexible where possible and focused on solving problems rather than accumulating grievances.

The larger opportunity lies in what China and Europe can build together. Green industries, electric mobility, renewable energy, advanced manufacturing and digital technologies are not merely sectors of competition; they are also areas where cooperation can generate scale, investment and innovation.

Europe needs affordable technology and productive investment. China needs sophisticated markets, global partnerships and predictable access to international commerce.The strategic objective should therefore be partnership with competition, rather than rivalry for its own sake.

Europe does not strengthen its autonomy by becoming less competitive with China. It strengthens it by becoming more innovative, productive and resilient at home while maintaining the widest possible network of economic partnerships abroad. China, for its part, has every interest in seeing a prosperous European economy rather than a weakened trading partner retreating behind protectionist barriers.

The Brussels summit should keep that larger picture in view. Rationality, multilateralism and open dialogue are not signs of economic weakness; they are tools of strategic strength.

In a world already fractured by conflict, tariffs and geopolitical mistrust, China and Europe have an opportunity to demonstrate something increasingly rare: Major powers can compete without becoming enemies, defend their interests without abandoning openness, and turn economic interdependence from a source of anxiety into a foundation for shared growth.

The choice facing Brussels is ultimately bigger than China. Europe can build walls around its economic problems, or build the competitiveness needed to overcome them. Its future, and perhaps the stability of the global economy, will depend on choosing the latter.

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