Why Taiwan's restoration brooks no debate

Editor's note: Zhou Wenxing, a special commentator for CGTN, is an associate professor at the School of International Studies and assistant dean of the Huazhi Institute for Global Governance, Nanjing University, China. He writes extensively on comparative politics and international relations, with an emphasis on the Taiwan question and China-US relations. The article reflects the author's opinions, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

This year marks the 81st anniversary of Taiwan's restoration to China. Yet at a moment when the historical record should be especially clear, some politicians, commentators and media outlets notably in Western countries have revived the so-called theory that "Taiwan's status is undetermined." By selectively reading wartime documents and severing them from the legal and political arrangements that followed Japan's defeat, such arguments seek to cast doubt on a matter that was settled through the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War and the postwar international order.

Revisiting the documentary record is therefore not an exercise in nostalgia. It is essential to understand how the island of Taiwan returned to China and why the one-China principle remains rooted in both history and international law.

The legal chain begins with the Cairo Declaration. Issued by China, the United States and the United Kingdom on December 1, 1943, the declaration made the territorial consequences of Japan's aggression explicit. It stated that all the territories Japan stole from China would be restored to the latter. Taiwan and the Penghu Islands were identified as Chinese territories seized by Japan and were to be restored to China.

The Cairo Declaration was not an isolated political statement. Its terms were incorporated into the conditions for Japan's surrender. On July 26, 1945, China, the US and the UK issued the Potsdam Proclamation, which declared in Article 8 that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." The Soviet Union later joined the proclamation.

Japan's Instrument of Surrender, signed on September 2, 1945, explicitly accepted the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation and pledged to carry them out in good faith. Through this sequence, the commitment to return Taiwan to China moved from an Allied declaration to binding terms accepted by defeated Japan.

The surrender arrangements put those terms into practice. On October 25, 1945, the ceremony accepting Japan's surrender in China's Taiwan Province was held in Taipei. The Chinese government announced the resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan and Japanese colonial rule came to an end. Taiwan’s restoration was therefore not simply a political aspiration announced during wartime; it was implemented as part of the surrender and postwar settlement.

Taken together, the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, Japan's Instrument of Surrender and the postwar arrangements form a coherent historical and legal chain. Each reinforces the others.

Cairo identified Taiwan and Penghu as territories to be restored to China. Potsdam required Cairo's terms to be implemented. Japan accepted Potsdam as the basis of its surrender. And the surrender arrangements restored Chinese administration over Taiwan. This sequence underpins the Chinese government’s position that Taiwan’s return to China was accomplished both de jure and de facto in 1945.

The subsequent change of government in China did not alter China’s sovereignty or territorial boundaries. When the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, it replaced the previous government as the government representing China. China as a subject of international law did not thereby become a new state, nor did Taiwan cease to be part of Chinese territory.

The unresolved political confrontation across the Taiwan Strait arose from the continuation of the Chinese civil war and external interference. In this sense, the Taiwan question is a legacy of China’s civil war and an internal affair of China, not a question of determining to which country Taiwan belongs.

This historical context is crucial when assessing today’s attempts to revive the "undetermined status" narrative. Such claims typically rely on fragmentary readings of postwar history while bypassing the wartime instruments that established the terms of Japan's defeat.

They also disregard the international practice that has developed around the one-China principle. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 restored all the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and recognized the representatives of its government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the organization. Today, the one-China principle forms the political foundation of China’s diplomatic relations with the overwhelming majority of countries around the globe.

To challenge that framework by rewriting the history of Taiwan's restoration is therefore not merely to dispute China's position on a contemporary political issue, it is to question the authority of the arrangements that emerged from the victory over fascism and militarism. The postwar order in Asia was built in part on reversing the territorial consequences of Japanese aggression. Taiwan's restoration to China was one of those consequences.

Eighty-one years later, the historical record remains clear. The Cairo Declaration set out the destination of Taiwan and Penghu; the Potsdam Proclamation made that commitment a condition of Japan’s surrender; Japan accepted those terms; and the surrender arrangements implemented them.

Respecting these facts and upholding the one-China principle is therefore not only a matter of respecting China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is also a matter of preserving the seriousness, continuity and authority of the postwar international order itself.

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