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Why Party self-governance matters for people's well-being

Party member volunteers help local farmers with the grain harvest in a village in Wuzhou, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, south China, October 21, 2026. /CFP
Party member volunteers help local farmers with the grain harvest in a village in Wuzhou, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, south China, October 21, 2026. /CFP

Party member volunteers help local farmers with the grain harvest in a village in Wuzhou, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, south China, October 21, 2026. /CFP

Editor's Note: Xia Lu, a special commentator for CGTN, is a professor at the School of the Communist Party of China (CPC) History and Party Building and a research associate at the National Academy of Development and Strategies of Renmin University of China. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

The recently concluded Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has published a document that, at first glance, looks like a classic piece of internal party homework: a decision on "persistently advancing the comprehensive and rigorous self-governance of the Party." To Western observers accustomed to separating "party affairs" from "public administration," this might seem like a closed-door political ritual. It is not. It is, in fact, a sophisticated blueprint for modernizing state governance – one that reveals a core Chinese axiom: strengthening the Party is strengthening the delivery of public goods.

In China's political architecture, the CPC is not merely a political organization vying for office; it is the primary administrative apparatus that designs and executes national strategies. Therefore, the quality of the Party's internal governance directly dictates the quality of public services. If the Party's grassroots organizations are lax, if bureaucratic formalism thrives, or if the "last mile" of policy implementation is blocked, even the most generous social policies – including but not limited to education, healthcare, housing, or elderly care – will be distorted by local protectionism or rent-seeking activities. Conversely, when the Party imposes strict discipline, it essentially upgrades the "operating system" of the administration. It aligns the incentives of 100 million grassroots officials with the actual needs of 1.4 billion citizens.

This is where the concept of shí (concrete, practical) comes into play. The Fifth Plenum's emphasis on "precise and efficient" policy execution is already reshaping the social contract in tangible ways.

In the field of education, the crackdown on vanity projects and the promotion of teacher mobility schemes – such as the cross-district teacher rotations in Zhejiang Province – ensure that educational equity is not just a slogan but a logistical reality. By disciplining local cadres who prioritize "hardware over teaching quality," the Party is redirecting resources to where they are actually needed: the classrooms of rural villages.

In the field of healthcare, the anti-corruption campaign within the medical sector is a direct intervention to protect the public interest. By dismantling invisible "unwritten rules" that drive up costs and breaking down data silos, the government is building “compact medical communities” that bring quality care to county levels. When a "smart mobile hospital" in Fujian Province can reach a bedridden elderly person in a remote mountain village, it clearly demonstrates how political discipline translates into institutional empathy and policy implementation.

In the field of elderly care, the focus on "pocket-sized nursing homes" and community-based dining services is backed by a ruthless purging of "flies and ants" – low-level corruption that siphons off subsidies for the elderly. This is governance by "responsive listening." Beijing municipality's "Immediate Response to Complaints" mechanism, which has handled over 200 million cases with a satisfaction rate exceeding 97%, shows that a sensitive organizational network is the ultimate safety net for the vulnerable.

Volunteer Party members, acting ahead of an impending flood, relocate elderly residents from the first floor to the second floor and assist them in making their beds, at a nursing home in Taizhou, Zhejiang Province, east China, August 27, 2026. /CFP
Volunteer Party members, acting ahead of an impending flood, relocate elderly residents from the first floor to the second floor and assist them in making their beds, at a nursing home in Taizhou, Zhejiang Province, east China, August 27, 2026. /CFP

Volunteer Party members, acting ahead of an impending flood, relocate elderly residents from the first floor to the second floor and assist them in making their beds, at a nursing home in Taizhou, Zhejiang Province, east China, August 27, 2026. /CFP

For international observers and China watchers, the key to understanding this is to look past the ideological labels. China's approach to "full and rigorous Party self-governance" is essentially a massive investment in governance capacity. It provides three things: disciplinary rigidity (making it too costly to muddle through), institutional loops (making it impossible to intercept resources), and value anchoring (reminding cadres that their legitimacy comes from solving people's problems).

Many overseas analysts mistakenly view China's anti-corruption drives as so-called purges. But the Chinese experience suggests that rectifying the Party's style of work is also a reinvestment in administrative efficiency. When the hidden rules are swept away and power is made transparent, public resources are allocated based on real needs rather than connections. The "last mile" of policy implementation no longer drops the ball. The relationship between the Party and the people is not maintained by slogans, but by the actual handling of practical matters.

When the Xi Jinping Party-building Thought was first introduced in June of 2026, the author once stated that the strict governance of the Party should move toward institutionalization and systematization; and the Fifth Plenum marks the concentrated implementation of that objective. Systematization is reflected in the "full-chain integration": the integrated advancement of political, ideological, organizational, conduct-related, disciplinary, institutional, and anti-corruption work; the integration across the central, local, grassroots, and emerging sectors; the integration of personnel selection, education, supervision, and accountability; the integration of the principles that one must not dare, cannot, or wish to do so; and the integration of responsibility for Party governance with national governance and oversight.

To govern the country effectively, one must first govern the Party; only when the Party becomes strong can the country be strong. The signal sent by this plenary session is clear: Exercising full and rigorous self-governance over the Party is not a sprint, but the long-term immune system of a century-old Party. Ultimately, the CPC's governance logic is a "pragmatic dialectic": the stricter the Party is with itself, the warmer the lives of its people become. 

The "rigor" of the Fifth Plenum is meant to light up the streets, make hospital appointments easier, ensure meals are delivered to the elderly, and guarantee that subsidies arrive on time. When things are done practically, hearts grow closer; when the people feel the improvement, the Party's foundation becomes more solid, thereby securing its long-term governance. Therefore, to strengthen Party discipline is to strengthen people's livelihoods; to enhance organizational capacity is to enhance the sense of gain.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com. Follow @thouse_opinions on X to discover the latest commentaries in the CGTN Opinion Section.)

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