Editor's note: Tom Fowdy is a UK-based political analyst. The article reflects the author's views, and not necessarily those of CGTN.

On Friday night U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted an update on the status of negotiations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) over the nuclear issue. He dismissed criticism over a lack of progress in recent months, setting out that “we are in no hurry,” and “are doing just fine” as well expressing confidence that leader Kim Jong Un would make the right decision.

The comments seem a world away from the urgency by which the administration approached Pyongyang over the issue last year, where Washington even went as far as threatening preemptive military action if the country did not agree to enter negotiations on denuclearization.

The wider context political, however, has changed dramatically. The tweets reflect a growing acknowledgment that Trump's foreign policy priorities have shifted. Even though the administration's paramount goals on the DPRK have not changed nor been dropped, the administration has since entangled itself in wider struggles with China and Iran with much larger political stakes.

As a result, assuming he has the upper hand in leverage over Pyongyang with maintained sanctions, Trump is happy to take his time in the DPRK negotiations with the belief Kim Jong Un will eventually concede to making a deal, seemingly ignoring the pressing influence of hawks in his administration.

In 2017 when Trump undertook the office of presidency, he set out that the DPRK would be his first priority as a foreign policy issue. His self-appointed mission? To stop the country from building a nuclear missile which could successfully reach the United States, “It won't happen!” so he tweeted.

The issue escalated from there into a full-blown crisis as Pyongyang, recognizing the shift in sentiment from Washington, sought to advance their capabilities as fast as possible. This, in turn, would accumulate in Trump's very own threats to “destroy” the country with “fire and fury.” Many people feared the worst.

However, the DPRK was not truly the biggest of Trump's goals. Instead, it was merely a case of getting something problematic out of the way to take aim on a bigger issue: China.

By 2018, the situation would transition as rapidly as it emerged. Threats of war and endless missile testing soon disappeared as mutual dialogue opened between Washington and Pyongyang via the medium of Seoul. As the two leaders met in Singapore, Trump took no hesitation in declaring victory and that the “nuclear threat is over.”

But ever so quickly as that ended, something else started.

That is, the trade war. By as early as April Trump sensed the nuclear crisis was over. Now, it was time to pursue his bigger and more politically significant agenda, one which had constituted the backbone of his campaign.

For the previous year, Trump had in fact put the DPRK issue first because doing so leaned upon earnest cooperation with Beijing, something which may have been less possible and goodwill orientated had he ignited his assertive tactics straight away.

As soon as it became concurrently clear the DPRK was now entering dialogue, the priorities shifted almost immediately. Trump unleashed the tariffs.

Since that time, the anti-China elements of Trump's policy have ballooned and Pyongyang has featured less, and less. His tweet threats were no longer about preemptive military action on nuclear facilities, but the expansion of tariffs and full-blown economic warfare.

With each month, the administration would act to open up more fronts against Huawei, against the Belt and Road Initiative, with Taiwan and Africa. The list goes on.

In the meanwhile, the DPRK issue has stalled. With the U.S. having refused any concessions on sanctions to Pyongyang as an element of negotiations, progress has been scant. Trump doesn't appear to care.

As a man who thinks in terms of deals, he sees the sanctions implemented in 2017 as superior leverage which will eventually force Kim to concede in the long run. This, of course, is erroneous, the DPRK will not unilaterally cave into a position of weakness.

Inevitably, Trump has received much criticism for this by foreign policy analysts, but again that doesn't bother him. On a domestic level, he is still able to claim he won and this is ultimately what counts. The parameters he set, which concerned ending Kim's attempts to secure a nuclear capability capable of hitting the United States, were in fact achieved.

On his “America First” nationalist criteria, Trump has been able to slice a line between that and the wider issue of nuclear non-proliferation as a whole. His supporters care about their country and the former, they don't care about the latter.

Thus, while negotiations will continue and there is much anticipation that a send summit between the two leaders early next year can secure a breakthrough, Trump isn't in a rush. He's quite relaxed. With bigger priorities at hand, he has the political space to downplay this issue and keep the more hawkish members of his cabinet at bay. 

Still though, one must question, for just how long?

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