Editor's Note: Swaran Singh is a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and senior fellow at Charhar Institute in Beijing. The article reflects the author’s opinion, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

After two cancellations – in April and July – the inaugural meeting between the US Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense with their Indian counterparts, or 2+2, is finally taking place in New Delhi on Thursday. All this delay was triggered by the never-ending global fighting by US President Trump's team and, like his other policies, have already shrunk and shifted the goal posts for the highest level India-US interaction of the year. 

Now, their constantly changing gears on the agenda perhaps aptly reflects the fast changing regional geopolitics in the last 18 months, which has seen New Delhi drifting closer to Tehran, Moscow and Beijing. To add insult to injury, President Trump has not yet acknowledged, let alone accepted, New Delhi's long pending invitation to be the chief guest for India's Republic Day celebrations in January next year!

So, despite repeated denials, three issues that will especially whip up emotions in their hardheaded 2+2 deliberations include (a) US demands from India to "zero out" its oil imports from Iran by November 3, (b) the expectation that India should renege on its purchase of Russian S-400 long-range, air-defense system, and (c) India to shun its recalcitrant attitude and sign the second foundational, Communications and Compatibility Security Agreement (COMCASA) that will facilitate defense technology transfers from the US. The pending defense contracts are perhaps the reason why President Trump has not yet confirmed his India visit next year.

First about Iran. Ever since President Trump unilaterally withdrew in May this year from the hard-earned multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or Iran nuclear deal of 2015, he has whipped up rhetoric for isolating and sanctioning Tehran again. India here becomes a target of Obama's Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, which allows the president to impose "secondary" sanctions on companies and countries doing business with Iran, thereby undermining the efficacy of US sanctions. 

Add to it Trump's own Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of 2017 that proposes sanctions on countries procuring defense technologies from US adversaries. This is where again India's defense cooperation with Russia remains an expected target. Both these acts, however, allow the president to hand out "waivers" to certain nations in the name of "important national interest" of US, but India is yet to receive any such assurance.  

Iran happens to be India's second, sometimes third, most important supplier of oil and the two share links based on civilization and a strategic partnership of over 15 years. Iran has often been cited as most apt case for explaining both the sanctity and breach of India's much touted "strategic autonomy" principle that guides its foreign relations. 

Likewise, Moscow has been India's most enduring partner, the pillar of political support and most reliable supplier of defense technologies and weapons systems. Currently the two have reached an advanced level of negotiations for the purchase of Russia's S-400 Triumf air defense systems which risks sanctions under Trump's CAATSA. 

While India has already placed defense contracts worth 15 billion US dollars with the US and is currently negotiating for more, how can the US assume to provide India with alternatives when it comes to supplying millions of barrels per day of oil at the same prices Iran has on offer? Indeed, in face of complicating US-Pakistan relations, India's revamping of Chabahar Port in Iran promises to provide an alternative route to Afghanistan where US forces have been facing ever increasing violence and dominance of Taliban militants, forcing US to open direct negotiations with them. 

As regards to US expectations on India signing their second foundational agreement, COMCASA, India had signed their first foundational Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), after 13 years of on-and-off negotiations, in August 2016. Compared to that their first round of formal negotiations on COMCASA only began in June so this may also continue to create irritants for India's free access to encrypted and secret defense technologies from the US, thus hampering future defense contacts. Therefore, the fact that the 2+2 agenda remains uncertain and has expanded to focus on strategic priorities and the larger Indo-Pacific region provides an easy escape from the quagmire of their continued neglect of each other.

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