Editor's note: David Lee is a consultant and author based in Beijing who works on cross-cutting themes of energy, health, international politics and international development. The article reflects the author's opinion, and not necessarily the views of CGTN. 

It is always with a very fond memory that I think of my graduate program majoring in political science in Leiden University, the Netherlands, one of the oldest and most prestigious institutions of higher learning in Continental Europe. The ancient university town offers a top academic atmosphere in its picturesque tranquility, which has been a natural companion for calm, unbiased observation and analysis.

If Albert Einstein used to benefit from this Leiden calmness during his teaching tenure here, thus helping with tremendous natural science advancements, almost a century later, this sound academic composure in Leiden, now manifest in the field of political economy as part of social science, has generated comprehensive case studies that thoroughly examine four of China's investment projects in Europe, particularly against the backdrop of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Last December, LeidenAsiaCenter, an independent research center affiliated with Leiden University, published a report to assess China's influence in Europe through technology and infrastructure investments. The four investment projects examined include two in Eastern and Southern Europe – the Hungary-Serbia Railway project and COSCO's investment in the Port of Piraeus, Greece – and two in the Netherlands itself – the acquisition of Dutch semiconductor firm NXP by Chinese asset management firm JAC and COFCO's purchase of the Dutch trading company Nidera. 

Each case, according to the LeidenAsiaCenter report, has been found with an identifiable commercial basis for the Chinese investment, though the actual economic and political viability of each deal varies. While refuting the simplistic conclusion that China purchases influence in Europe through the projects, researchers believe the European companies and host countries have their own calculations for entering into the deals with China. 

Particularly, Greek, Hungarian, and Serbian governments have played active roles in seeking out Chinese investment, not only to boost their local economies but also as political and economic leverage to counterbalance the weight of the European Union.

The LeidenAsiaCenter case studies are shining examples of objectivity, which has been rare at a time when rising China's investment footprint gradually grows bigger. At least amid Western media, too much oversimplification has clouded sound judgment, potentially curtailing mutually beneficial cooperation. As I laud the quality research from Leiden, I'd call for such objectivity and sound analysis to be the mainstream, instead of a rarity, in Europe.

More importantly, the LeidenAsiaCenter case studies offer key insights into Eastern and Southern European practicalities and sensitivities. Candid and objective observations are all the more important in this part of Europe, as Europe has two distinct groups of countries in its west and “non-west.” This EU particularity only adds to the political and economic sensitivity of China's investment in the continent.

In a report, last October, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) notes that, while the bulk of China's investments still go to Western Europe, there has been an uptick in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe including the Western Balkans. The CEIP report cites recent developments as potential results of China's increasing influence, such as efforts by Hungary and/or Greece to join other EU members in denouncing China on multiple occasions.

This, in my opinion, is more judgmental imagination than truth. While assuming China would exploit perceived European vulnerabilities, this CEIP argument belittles independent discretion by individual European countries.

Of course, China must aptly deal with European sensitivities and concerns. However, I'd like to challenge Europeans to be brave enough to look at their own unity and cohesion as affects how individual members' legitimate development needs are reasonably satisfied. I'd also like to challenge Europeans, proud of the strength of EU institutions and processes, to be confident enough to work with China on development, so as to materialize the China Opportunity.   

To quote the LeidenAsiaCenter report, “too much of European media, think tank, and policymaker commentary has been based on alarmist assertions and limited evidence regarding a direct linkage between Chinese investment and influence in Europe.” To echo the call from the LeidenAsiaCenter report, “a more nuanced and careful analysis that goes beyond alarmism and polarization” is keenly needed.

I'd say that, to some extent, how to treat the China Opportunity, in the form of Chinese investment, infrastructure, and other projects is an internal challenge that Europe must address for its own unity and progress. I'd give my best wishes to Europe for a success on this front. 

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com.)