'Middle Power' diplomacy: Turkey's game between the U.S. and Russia

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Europe

Editor's note: Tom Fowdy is a British political and international relations analyst and a graduate of Durham and Oxford Universities who writes on topics pertaining to China, the DPRK, Britain and the U.S. The article reflects the author's opinion, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Earlier this week, Turkey was on the receiving end of criticism from the United States for purchasing S-400 missile defense system from Russia. Outraged at a member of the alliance making such a deal; in its typical transactional and coercive mode of diplomacy, the presidential administration announced that it would be ceasing the sale of F-35 fighters to the Anatolian nation.

The spat marks the latest in a series of frosty relations between Ankara and Washington, with Donald Trump having previously threatened tariffs on the Anatolian country which plunged its currency value last year, in retaliation to threats from the country to invade Kurdish held territory on the northern border.

Relations between the United States and Turkey are sinking, but they are unlikely to turn completely hostile. It is not the will of either side for Ankara to leave the NATO alliance either. Instead, Recep Erdogan's foreign policy must be understood within the light of geographical and historical trends.

Although the values of his country seemingly clash with what Western countries would expect, it has always been the modus operandi of Turkey to hedge between Russia and the United States. Its NATO membership has been based on strategic advantage, than a commitment to the collective defense of Western values.

Turkey is a crossroads between civilizations. The Anatolian peninsula is by geography, a transitional land between Europe and the Middle East. Such positioning has set the stage for a complex history, whereby it has been an integral part of both realms.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mevlut Cavusoglu (L) walks with U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo during their meeting in Washington, U.S., April 3, 2019. /VCG Photo

In ancient times, it was a hub of the Roman Empire and then, of course, Byzantium, a centerpiece of Christian history and legacy. Then, when the Ottoman's conquered Anatolia and made it their homeland, it would become the center of the world's most powerful empires for decades, taking upon it the leadership of the Islamic world under the mantle of the caliph.

Thus, as a mid-point between Europe and Asia Minor, contemporary Turkey in the 20th century has long attracted the strategic interests of Western powers seeking to expand their foothold over the Middle East. To the immediate south is Iraq and Syria, to the east is Iran.

Ankara itself has seen long benefits in playing this game. By courting the United States and allies, giving them access to its territory in supporting their broader Middle East objectives, it could reap lucrative rewards and defense commitments which would then allow Turkey to project power itself across the Middle East and more readily secure its own interests.

Thus, in 1952 Turkey became a member of NATO. This coincided with its rise as a regional power.

But regional powers, or “Middle Powers” if you will, rarely allow themselves to be dominated by a single great power. As meaningfully sized and influential countries, they often have other interests to look out for as well, not least on a regional basis. In Turkey's considerations, geography plays a role again.

To the immediate north of the country sits the Black Sea, which is home to the traditional naval projection of a great power neighbor, Russia. Despite being de-facto Western aligned, the proximity of Turkey to the Russian Federation means that it cannot afford to be hostile, but nor can the latter. Moscow wants continual naval access to the Bosporus waterway which connects the Black and Mediterranean seas.

Thus, both have a great deal to gain from the other.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Mevlut Cavusoglu (R) and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov giving a press conference during the seventh meeting of Turkey-Russia high-level cooperation council, March 29, 2019. /VCG Photo

Hence, the Cold War painted an unusual position for Turkey. Despite being a member of NATO, it in fact received foreign aid from the Soviet Union, the only of its kind to do so. By being warm to Turkey, the USSR and thus contemporary Russia have long recognized that they can continue to keep Ankara sitting on the fence, reaping benefits for itself, than being completely loyal to the United States.

Hence this has long created the unusual scenario whereby even though Turkey is a member of the alliance, it puts clear limits on how far it is willing to cooperate with the United States unless it is strictly in its own interests to do so. The geography here is converted into political power.

As a result, even though Washington is angry about Turkey's purchase of such a missile defense system, it will not change Ankara's position at all. Sure there may be a crossfire of words, but Erdogan will largely sit comfortably where he is. Turkey is thus aware that NATO cannot afford to lose them as a strategic bridge.

Thus, there is space for them to continually hedge around and create political space for themselves bouncing between the U.S. and Russia.

When the time eventually comes, Turkey will be otherwise very happy to make amends with Washington, putting Russia on the back seat again for a while, and vice-versa. Such is the story of Middle Power diplomacy.

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