A peace deal was signed in 2016 between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) group to end a long-lasting armed conflict that weighed down on the country.

Now, two years after the peace agreement, the country is still facing uncertainty, amid a campaign by the newly-elected President Iván Duque targeting the agreement.

There seems to be a potential for further conflict.

Bernardo Perez Salazar, an associate researcher and professor at the Catholic University of Colombia holds the opinion that it is unnecessary to over-interpret the president's campaign as he believes that there are more critical issues for his administration.

The agreement is not on the agenda, Bernado notes, adding that what Duque is trying to do is separating his government from the deal that the previous president had signed.

The current implementation of the peace agreement is flawed.

Emiliana Molina, the Washington political correspondent for Colombian news channel NTN24, points out that only a small part of FARC gave up their weapons and went back to normal life, and that the political engagement of guerrilla-stricken areas is low. Few people have also switched from illegal coca plantation to legal crops.

James Jones, a social anthropologist who previously served as a UN rural development adviser in Colombia, expresses concern about the life threats to former FARC members who were demobilized in the peace agreement.

It is unfortunate that the government persecutes them, he maintains.

On the other hand, 40 percent of FARC members never really disbanded, and are reportedly aligning with criminal groups.

He suggests that the top issue for the government now is the lack of political coordination that can propel rural development.

There is fear that returning violence could send back FARC members to the battlefield, but Juan Gonzalez, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, is not that pessimistic.

He sees the 2016 peace deal as a historical agreement, despite the flaws of the terms in coca planting and transitional justice.

Gonzalez thinks it is unfair to say that Duque does not want a peace agreement, opining that what the president is doing is revising and amending the deal.

Perez Salazar, on the other hand, thinks Gonzalez is a bit too ideal.

In his opinion, the peace agreement was not based on a single party's defeat. Duque may not have the power to alter the deal unilaterally against the other party's interest. At the same time, over moral issues, FARC is the entity respecting the peace agreement while the government is trying to downplay the deal and breach it, he notes. The government's action is losing confidence and credibility in the peace process.

Gonzalez introduces that the U.S. government is now standing with the Colombian army on the battlefield, and supporting them on the negotiating table. The critical concern for the U.S. now is the coca cultivation, and Washington wants to exert more pressure on Duque's administration to take a harder stance on coca farmers.

Molina, meanwhile, believes that the key to the problem is the development issues in these coca planting regions. Farmers there need investment and money to switch to legal crops. The U.S. is still considering FARC as a terrorist group, which prevents aids to those farmers related to the group.

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