Will Russia change its diplomatic moves toward the DPRK?

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Editor's note: Dmitry Stefanovich is a research fellow at Russia International Affairs Council (RIAC) and an independent expert in the field of international affairs, strategic stability, military technology, and conflicts. The article reflects the author's opinion, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Russia is at the center of international news coverage. This week, Russia is hosting the 2018 Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) and massive military exercises Vostok-2018, both involving Chinese participation.

One of the major regional areas of cooperation between Russia and China is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and broader security issues related to the nuclear and missile program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

There were reports that Kim Jong Un could visit Vladivostok to attend the EEF, but the DPRK leader has not made an appearance.

The Federation Council (the Upper Chamber of the Russian Parliament) Speaker Valentina Matvienko recently paid a visit to Pyongyang, where she held talks with Chairman Kim and attended the celebrations commemorating the 70th anniversary of the DPRK's founding.

Russian Army officers walk next to a poster showing a map of Russia during the Vostok-2018 (East-2018) military drills at Telemba training ground, some 130 km north of the Siberian city of Chita, on September 12, 2018. /VCG Photo.

The topic of the Korean leader visiting Russia was raised once again, and he was presented with an invitation from President Vladimir Putin. Afterward, Matvienko stated that diplomats are beginning to work on a time and place for such a summit.

The Russian and Chinese "dual suspension" initiative as part of a blueprint to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula became the de facto basis (regardless of what the United States may say) for the current suspension of "provocative activities" on and around the Peninsula, such as ICBM test launches and massive joint US/ROK military exercises, which laid the groundwork for the Singapore Trump-Kim Summit. Of course, this is only the first step, but nevertheless a very important one.

Military attaches and journalists attend a briefing organised by the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation to discuss the forthcoming Vostok-2018 military exercise. /VCG Photo.

What does Russia need from the DPRK? The obvious answer: Russia does not need a war on its borders, especially not a nuclear one; thus, a fundamental task would be preventing a military clash between Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington (and probably other parties).

As a global power, Russia needs to ensure its status as an important player, a stakeholder in major conflict resolution processes, so the revival of the six-party talks discontinued in 2009 may be an important task as well. Moreover, this mechanism may address broader Northeast Asia security concerns.

Addressing the nuclear issue per se is very important as well. The means of denuclearizing the Peninsula or somehow establishing a control regime or stable regional deterrence mechanism will definitely influence the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) shakes hands with South Korean Prime Minister Lee Nak-yeon during a meeting on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russia September 12, 2018. /VCG Photo

Other non-NPT nuclear weapons states (India, Pakistan and Israel) and nuclear threshold states that have the capability to develop nuclear weapons rather swiftly (Iran, but also Japan and many more) are definitely monitoring the process, and Russia, as an official possessor of nuclear weapons under the NPT, needs to preserve this treaty and relevant regimes, ensuring non-proliferation.

To achieve these goals, Russia may undertake diplomatic, economic and military activities. Direct communication with relevant actors, support and pressure for them to take the necessary steps and prevention of unnecessary escalation in terms of military deployments or new sanctions are most important.

The initiatives regarding trans-Korean gas pipeline and railroad have been on the table for a rather long time but remain in the development phase. Probably some parties other than Russia and "both Koreas" may catalyze the process: for example, the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) can provide financial instruments to facilitate infrastructure projects.

Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of DPRK Kim Yong Nam during a meeting. /VCG Photo

As a contingency and in case the conflict resolution on the Peninsula stalls, it may be useful to discuss the conceptual basis for non-nuclear deterrence (a buzzword within the Russian military that lacks precise definition) with regional actors. Communication and clear understanding of capabilities and intentions remain crucial prerequisites for strategic stability, both on a regional and global scale.

Geography and history made Russia an important part of "Korean equation", but we need bold initiatives to solve it.

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