Editor's note: Jeong-min Kim is a Seoul-based DPRK analyst who previously worked in the Reuters Seoul bureau and as Korea chair at CSIS (Center for Strategic International Studies). The article reflects the author's opinion, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

Kim Jong Un overseeing a "strike drill" on Saturday morning was a wake-up call for many Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) watchers, and hopefully for policymakers in the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as well.

The country fired unknown "projectiles" from the city of Wonsan around 9 a.m. local time which flew about 70 to 200 kms into the East Sea, the ROK's Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. This happened two weeks after DPRK state media said that Kim guided a "test-fire of a new-type tactical guided weapon" without specifying what the weapon was. This time, the drill came with pictures, which hinted that the launch was not only targeted at a domestic audience but also towards an international audience.

While the rhetoric on state media did not directly specify anything against the U.S., it seems Kim's message was directed both ways as KCNA reported that Kim stressed all service members to bear in mind "the iron truth that genuine peace and security are ensured and guaranteed only by powerful strength” and to “increase the combat ability in order to defend the sovereignty and economic self-sustenance of the country…from threats and invasion by any forces," which echoed his recent speech during the SPA.

Pictures of the weapons suggested that they were short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). And according to the defense researcher and DPRK monitor Nathan Hunt, Saturday's launch can be seen as "a new development in DPRK missile capability" as for example, it could help the DPRK "perfect a multistage solid-state ICBM if their ability to produce a solid-state engine improves." 

This should be a wake-up call for policymakers in Washington. This is explicit proof that any time wasted – due to a bad strategy failing to bring the DPRK to the negotiation table – will only give more time and space for DPRK to strengthen its artillery. It is known that the DPRK is continuously pushing for a phased approach in denuclearization with a different top nuclear negotiator from the U.S. side, while the U.S. is still pushing for the "big deal" approach which caused the Hanoi summit to end abruptly without an agreement.

There is no need to freak out yet as Saturday's drill was a relatively low-key calculated drill not on a par with escalations in 2017. However, one should still note that DPRK rhetoric is slowly heading back to the familiar hostility. There is a need for policymakers to rethink strategy if they are to avoid a vicious cycle between miscommunication and provocation.

The first reason for the U.S. to draft a new negotiation strategy is because, from Pyongyang's point of view, there is practically not much Kim is left to do. After the failure in Hanoi and with the U.S. side not showing any flexibility, he can't send an amiable signal for another summit nor send his top nuclear negotiator as the DPRK has already officially proclaimed they are not willing to negotiate with Bolton or Pompeo.

Kim also cannot opt to show his willingness for peace on the peninsula as inter-Korean projects are practically impossible due to sanctions. A Moon-Kim summit is also way down the list, as the recent Moon-Trump summit only repeated the U.S. concept of denuclearization and there is nothing Kim can gain from a summit with Moon at the moment.

All in all, Kim cannot do anything that looks like the DPRK is caving in to pressure, as it will make him lose face. Washington should remember that Kim cannot make all the decisions and elite reactions matter for his legitimacy and security.

There are two options Kim is left with: First, a goodwill gesture regarding Yongbyon as a start, but it seems Kim also cannot risk doing this at the moment as Trump has already said that the U.S. side thought Yongbyon is not enough and that they will push for all-for-all approach instead. The stake is too high for Kim, with uncertain revocable rewards.

Hence, the only thing he is left with, aside from doing nothing, is to send a message of frustration via minor provocation, nudging the U.S. From Pyongyang's point of view, this is also not the best option as they know that this will put Trump at a tough position being criticized for rewarding bad behavior. Still, the risk is smaller than the first option for Kim.

This is not to say that the U.S. should go along with everything that the DPRK wants. What I believe is that the U.S. should come up with a new strategy that keeps a healthy amount of pressure and a clear long-term goal, while coming up with practical viable options that Kim Jong Un can embrace without risking his legitimacy for the time being.

Some flexibility in strategy will be helpful for Washington as well, especially on managing uncertainty and risk. The DPRK is bound to do something similar to Saturday morning, with no other options left with to go for.

The U.S. current stance will reinforce a vicious cycle between disagreement, lack of communication, room for misinterpretation, mutual dissatisfaction and provocation, however minor. With the ROK not exactly working as a buffer-zone between the U.S. and the DPRK right now, it is imperative that Washington come up with new, realistically viable terms of negotiation.

"A deal will happen," Trump says. But it will happen only when the deal can get the stakeholders on board.

(If you want to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at opinions@cgtn.com.)