In the middle of the night on June 24, part of Champlain Towers South, a 12-story beachfront condominium in Florida, suddenly collapsed. 

Daniella Levine Cava, Miami-Dade County mayor, announced on July 7 that the search and rescue work had been transitioned to a recovery operation. As of Sunday, officials announced that most of victims recovered had been identified.

Crying, mourning, praying. And thousands of questions. But perhaps the most valuable questions at the moment are: What caused the condo to collapse, and what can be done to prevent it from happening again?

Residents didn't fully understand the risk of waiting

The first thing that came to people’s minds was: Did the residents know how bad the building’s condition was?

The answer is yes and no.

In fall 2018, the building board hired engineering firm Morabito Consultants to inspect the building. The final nine-page report points out multiple structural issues, including cracking, spalls, deterioration and damage, that require repair and remediation “in the immediate and near future.”

However, although a detailed inspection report was delivered to the building board, the residents, those who were in charge of making that final decision to pay the bill, at that time, did not fully understand the situation. After more than two years, the recommendations had not been implemented. And then tragedy struck.

The lack of explicit warning of collapse is what some experts and the condo board blamed Morabito Consultants for.

Huge bills made consensus hard to reach

The price tag is the other reason residents failed to reach a consensus for so long. The 2018 report’s initial estimate of the cost was already high and it then increased to more than $16 million this year. The association said it would repurpose more than $0.7 million in other dedicated funds to the repair plan, but there was still a bill of over $15 million for residents to split.

Not fully aware of the urgency and the catastrophic consequences that might occur, the residents were hesitant to pay so much. Some questioned whether the project was value for money and asked for the scope of the repairs to be reduced.

Moreover, the condo board in charge of pushing this forward was made up of volunteers. 

When the residents held divergent opinions and failed to reach a consensus, the volunteer condo board, which had no enforcement power, felt exhausted. Several resignations, the need to reorganize the board, and frequent vacuums led to repeated delays in the decision-making process.

When they finally decided to conduct the project, it was too late.

What policies say isn’t what has been done

Miami-Dade county, where the collapsed condo is located, requires buildings with more than 10 residents to go through a recertification process including inspection and following repairing works 40 years after they were built.

After the incident, however, people questioned whether the 40-year time limit is effective enough. The collapsed Champlain Towers South was built in 1981. It had only turned 40 years old this year. However, potential safety hazards were found through self-initiated inspections in 2018.

Florida State Senator Jason Pizzo suggested the requirement could be shortened to 20 years.

Even with the 40-year recertification system, the inspection and repair requirements still face obstacles in terms of enforcement.

Although the Miami-Dade County Code states that the failure to fulfill the requirement will result in Civil Violation Notice, fines, even forced evacuations and demolition, it gives extra days to cases it believes are on track.

In an audit initiated by the government in an emergency after the collapse incident, many buildings have been found to be delayed more than one year in fulfilling the requirements. 

In the city of North Miami Beach, a building’s board waited nine years to submit its inspection report, with the conclusion of it saying, "structurally and electrically not safe for the specified use for continued occupancy.” Residents then were immediately evacuated.

Policies have been established, but due to the negligence and incompetence, the intended effect may sometimes be in name only.

In the midst of solemn mourning and prayer, reflection on the systems and enforcement capability also allows no delay – the tragedy should not happen again.