One month after the United States and Israel launched large-scale strikes on Iran, the battlefield has been redrawn: energy infrastructure is in the crosshairs, maritime routes are under threat, and the alliance that launched the campaign is showing signs of fracture. As the ghost of past Middle Eastern wars hovers over the US and Israel pushes for a more fundamental reckoning, a central question is emerging: Will the fighting end with a decisive "final blow," or sink into a costly and prolonged military "quagmire" with growing regional and global risks?

How has the conflict evolved over the past month?

The initial wave of US‑Israeli strikes aimed to deliver a rapid, high‑impact blow to Iran's nuclear and military infrastructure, targeting key facilities and senior figures to degrade Tehran's strategic capabilities. But the trajectory since has been one of steady, uncontrolled expansion.

Iran's response quickly outgrew symbolic retaliation. Missile and drone attacks targeted US military installations across the Middle East and Israeli assets, while threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz materialized. Within weeks, a relatively contained exchange evolved into a broader confrontation, with spillover risks mounting for Gulf states.

A critical turning point came on March 18, when Israel struck Iran's South Pars gas field – one of the world's largest offshore energy projects. Tehran responded by escalating attacks on energy-related targets across the region.

For Wang Jin, director of the Center for Strategic Studies at Northwest University in China, this marked a fundamental shift. Once energy infrastructure becomes a target, he argued, the conflict enters a phase of "prolonged confrontation, expanding geography, and fewer operational constraints."

At the same time, the United States has been reinforcing its military posture in the region. Additional forces, including elements of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit and the 82nd Airborne Division, are being deployed to the region. 

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday indicated that operations could continue for weeks.

Are US, Israel still on the same page?

The first month has laid bare a growing rift between the United States and Israel over how the war should be fought and ended. 

Read more:

Cracks in US-Israel alliance widen as Iran conflict drags on

On paper, both sides share broad objectives: weakening Iran's military capabilities and constraining its nuclear program. In practice, however, their strategic calculations are beginning to diverge.

Robert Malley, a senior adviser at Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs, framed the contrast between the US and Israel starkly: Israel's objective is to fundamentally weaken or even topple the Iranian system. The United States, by contrast, appears less consistent. Malley argued that US President Donald Trump's position has been fluid, shaped as much by political calculation as by strategic planning, making the trajectory of US policy harder to predict.

This assessment is echoed by Professor Jia Qingguo of Peking University, who argued that Washington and Tel Aviv "differ on how far the war should go." In his view, the United States is now more inclined toward a limited campaign shaped by domestic timelines, while Israel is pursuing more far-reaching outcomes.

That divergence is reflected in operational tempo. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly argued that airpower alone cannot produce decisive change. Reports suggest Israel is accelerating strikes on high-value targets, partly out of concern that Washington could pivot toward negotiations before its objectives are achieved.

In Washington, caution prevails. Memories of Iraq and Afghanistan fuel resistance to large‑scale ground involvement. Analysts agree airstrikes can degrade capabilities but are unlikely to achieve maximalist aims, and further escalation carries severe, unpredictable risks. Rubio on Friday also maintained that US's objectives can still be achieved without large-scale ground intervention.

Why are negotiations failing to take hold?

Washington has suggested that indirect contacts with Tehran are underway and even yielding results. Iran, however, has rejected such claims, underscoring a deep deficit of trust that has only widened over the past year.

The reported US "15-point plan" illustrates the scale of disagreement. It includes demands for Iran to halt uranium enrichment, limit missile development, sever ties with regional allies, and ensure maritime access. Tehran has dismissed these conditions and put forward its own demands, including compensation and long-term guarantees.

Read more:

US sends Iran 15-point ceasefire plan as Tehran demands reparations

Wang Youyong, a professor of Arabic literature at Shanghai International Studies University, describes the US proposal as a form of "coercive bargaining," aimed at testing Iran's red lines rather than enabling genuine compromise.

More fundamentally, analysts pointed to a structural problem: both sides perceive themselves as acting from positions of strength. As Niu Xinchun, a professor from the China-Arab States Research Institute at Ningxia University, put it, "both the United States and Iran are negotiating as if they each were the victor. Under such conditions, even initiating substantive talks becomes difficult, let alone reaching agreement."

This helps explain what observers describe as a "negotiation paradox": one side speaks of progress, the other denies talks exist and neither is prepared to adjust its baseline demands. The difference extends beyond terms to the very definition of negotiation itself.

What are the possible scenarios?

As the conflict grinds on, analysts see some potential paths forward.

Professor Niu outlined the options: ending the war through negotiation; a unilateral US declaration of an end to the war; a protracted, frozen conflict; or a significant escalation.

A negotiated settlement appears the most difficult in the short term, given the wide gap in positions, but a temporary or partial ceasefire is possible, Niu said.

A unilateral move by Donald Trump is also possible, but problematic. The professor stressed: "You cannot stop the war simply by declaring it. If Iran or Israel continues fighting, such a move would have limited effect."

For Niu, a prolonged conflict is increasingly plausible. Yet this would likely leave both sides unable to achieve their objectives, creating a deadlock that could, in turn, generate pressure for escalation.

Experts also warn that the battlefield could expand in multiple directions. 

Beyond the Strait of Hormuz, attention is turning to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a strategic chokepoint at the entrance to the Red Sea.

Qin Tian, deputy director of the Middle East Studies Institute at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, noted that Iran has so far shown restraint in this area, suggesting it may be holding it in reserve.

If activated, this front could involve Iran-aligned groups such as the Houthis, potentially opening a second maritime theater. Analysts warn this would significantly disrupt global shipping and energy flows.

While the Houthis have not yet directly intervened in the current conflict, their leader publicly stated on March 26 that they would respond "militarily" if needed.

According to Axios, the Pentagon is developing military options for a "final blow" in Iran. Citing officials and sources familiar with internal discussions, Axios reported that options include targeting key Iranian energy hubs such as Kharg Island, seizing strategically located islands near the Strait of Hormuz, or even conducting limited ground operations.

Although Trump has not yet decided on any of these options and White House officials describe any potential ground action as "hypothetical," sources suggested the US president is prepared to escalate if negotiations fail to yield substantial results.

Professor Niu cautioned that even if such US operations were undertaken, they would be unlikely to resolve core issues while exposing forces to casualties and prolonging the conflict.

Is there still a path for diplomacy?

Despite the bleak outlook, a diplomatic opening has not entirely disappeared.

Several regional actors have signaled willingness to mediate. Pakistan on Saturday announced it will host a quadrilateral meeting of foreign ministers from Türkiye, Egypt and Saudi Arabia on March 30 to discuss evolving regional developments, including ongoing tensions in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, China has stepped up diplomatic engagement through a mix of high-level phone calls, shuttle diplomacy, face-to-face engagements, and multilateral channels, calling for restraint, protection of energy infrastructure, and the safeguarding of maritime routes.

Read more:

One month on: How is China working to defuse Middle East tensions?

Professor Li Fuquan from the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at Northwest University noted that both Iran and Gulf states see value in China's role as a relatively neutral intermediary. Gulf countries are increasingly concerned about spillover risks to their economies, while Iran is seeking to avoid further regional isolation.

Yet mediation faces a fundamental constraint. Director of Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Peking University Wu Bingbing pointed out that the core obstacle lies in the will of the United States and Israel. "Neither side has shown clear willingness to halt military operations," he argued, limiting the effectiveness of external mediation efforts.